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Abstract
The intent of this paper is to examine the impact of political instability in importing nations
on U.S. agricultural trade. A panel data set representing eighty−seven importing countries
covering the 1990−2000 period was used to investigate how the degree of democratic
practices and three types of political instability (violent, social, and elite) affect U.S
agricultural exports. The empirical results suggest that political instability do have a
statistically significant effect on U.S. agricultural export demand.
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Although an extensive empirical literature exists on the role of economic variables in 
explaining bilateral trade, the relationship between political variables and trade has been 
relatively ignored. Many previous studies have generated various trade elasticities with respect 
to prices, level of income, and exchange rates. However, just as macroeconomic and financial 
variables affect the level of bilateral trade flows and consequently, economic growth, the 
existence and stability of political institutions also matter for growth in bilateral trade among 
nations. Thus, it is important to investigate the role of political institutions in the performance 
of the export sector. 
Political instability can be defined generally as the degree of propensity for a change in 
the governance of a country, which may include any type of insurrection, revolution, and 
military-led coups. More specifically, political instability can be defined in terms of the 
frequency of events that increase the likelihood of social and political unrests. Examples of 
such indicators of political instability include the number of politically motivated 
assassinations, number of people killed as a result of domestic mass violence, number of 
successful coups, number of anti-government demonstrations and general strikes among others. 
Given the implications of recent news events, political instability may also include the effect of 
terrorist activities that can serve to undermine the stability of governments. Countries that have 
been reliably stable in the past can quickly become unstable after a substantial terrorist attack 
domestically or in neighboring nations. 
In the trade literature, the relationship between political instability and bilateral trade 
flows remains largely unexplored. The few attempts to integrate political variables into 
standard trade models have focused primarily on total trade with no explicit attention to the 
potential impact of political instability in foreign markets on U.S. agricultural exports. 
Srivastava and Green (1986) showed, with data from 45 exporting countries and 82 importing 
countries, that  “… stable nations tend to be the higher level exporters when bilateral trade are 
examined. Conversely, there is very little effect of the instability of the importing nation on the 
intensity of trade (p. 635).”  Similarly, Morrow et al (1998) tested alternative hypotheses of the 
effect of international politics on trade flows and found that democratic government structure 
and political alliances increase bilateral trade. However, their emphasis was more on politics 
and political arrangements rather than on political instability. In another study, Summary 
(1989) also tested for the role of political variables in trade and concluded from the empirical 
results that international political factors may be important determinants of U.S. trade in 
industrial products.  
Nevertheless, it is interesting to note that none of these past studies examined the 
impact of political instability on U.S. agricultural trade. There are several reasons why it is 
important to examine the effect of political instability on agricultural trade. First, the impact of 
political instability on the agricultural sector may be different from that of the industrial sector 
because of its relatively smaller size and other unique attributes. For instance, does the attribute 
of food as a basic necessity of life make the demand for US agricultural exports more or less 
responsive to foreign political instability? Also, agricultural trade represents approximately 10 
percent of overall U.S. trade flows in 2000. Thus in a study with aggregate U.S. trade data, the 
impact of political instability on the agricultural sector may be overshadowed by the sheer size 
of the industrial sector effects. Second, there is need to extend previous studies as many of the  
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developing nations analyzed in past analyses have experienced considerable political and 
economic changes in recent years that could have major implications for global agricultural 
trade. This paper bridges the gap in the literature by analyzing the impact of political instability 
on U.S. agricultural trade over the period 1990 - 2000.  
 
2.  Conceptual Framework 
 
Political instability can affect international trade directly through its effect on income and 
prices and indirectly through its impact on other economic variables such as investment in 
physical capital. The impact of PI on trade can be viewed from the perspective of both the 
exporter and importer country. 
 
2.1 Exporting country Impact 
In the case of the exporting country, internal political instability can directly affect the 
level of exports. Domestic production may be negatively affected by the increasing level of 
political and economic uncertainty. Productivity can be negatively affected by disruption of 
production schedules generated by political instability during periods of labor strikes and 
political unrest. The production inefficiency argument was empirically supported by findings of 
several researchers (see Alesina and Tabellini, 1989). The possibility of sudden government 
change to a new political administration that may engage in anti-market economic policies may 
be disturbing to local and foreign investors and entrepreneurs. For example, economic polices 
that impose new taxes on capital and productive activities would discourage expansion in 
domestic production. Rather, it will encourage the substitution of productive domestic 
investments in favor of consumption and capital flight.  
Furthermore, potential disruptions from political instability create political risk for 
economic agents involved in international trade. The higher the potential for political 
instability, the more profitable the trade should be to compensate for the risk of future 
disruption and loss of export revenue. Also, the potential threat of future government action to 
restrict trade can lead to reduction in the current production and volume of international trade 
(Pollins, 1989, Morrow et al, 1998). Not only does PI reduce productivity of labor and capital 
factors, it can also lead to significant decline in high skilled human capital because of the 
“brain drain” that usually accompanies political instability (Gyimah-Brempong, 1999, Fosu, 
2003).  
Several studies have shown that a negative relationship between PI and domestic 
economic performance can be established via a transmission variable such as income inequality 
and investment (Barro, 1991, Alesina and Rodrik, 1994, Persson and Tabellini, 1994, Easterly 
and Levine, 1997). Income inequality can stimulate political instability, which in turn harms 
capital accumulation (investment) and economic growth. Social discontent motivated by 
income inequality can lead to an increase in cases of socio-political instability which may 
cause a reduction in physical capital investment. Furthermore, foreign direct investment is 
reduced as foreign firms and investors may be discouraged by the regular stoppages of 
investment projects and productive activities due to frequent occurrences of political crises 
(e.g., coup d’etats, riots, guerrilla warfare, labor strikes, and kidnappings). Consequently, 
political instability reduces investment and thus impedes economic growth and trade. 
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2.1 Importing country Impact 
In the case of the importing country, political instability can indirectly affect the level 
of imports demanded via the impact of political uncertainty on economic growth and other 
macroeconomic variables such as domestic prices, income, interest rates, unemployment, and 
exchange rates (Cukierman et al, 1992, Collins, 1996). Political instability increases financial 
capital flight and reduces the incentive for the accumulation of physical capital that ultimately 
leads to reduction in economic growth. Lower economic growth rate implies lower national 
income and decline in the ability to pay for imports. Thus, the demand for imports of U.S. 
agricultural products may decline due to political instability abroad.  
Alternatively, political instability in importing countries may lead to an increase in the 
demand for U.S. agricultural products. This scenario is plausible if one assumes that imports 
serve as a foreign substitute for losses in domestic production caused by the disruptive effects 
of political instability. Political instability can lead to higher U.S. export demand in the short 
run as it could serve as a domestic supply shifter in the importing country. Assuming a 
composite agricultural commodity, if there is political instability in the import market 
(reducing domestic production)
, then the domestic supply curve can shift leftward. Thus, the 
demand for imports could increase.  This implies the possibility of a short-run increase in U.S. 
agricultural exports due to instability-induced shock to domestic production in the importing 
country. Of course, this scenario would be attenuated by the negative impact of political 
instability on the purchasing power of importers as income level declines. Nevertheless, people 
must eat, so there would still be some level of food imports even though income may decline. 
Hence, the relative impact of political instability compared to income effects on food imports is 
a matter of empirical testing. 
 
3.  Empirical Analysis 
 
Early empirical formulations tried to capture the relationship between political instability and 
export growth by incorporating measures of political instability in an export growth equation 
which capture demand-side influences (Srivastava and Green, 1986, Summary, 1989, Fosu, 
2003). As discussed in the previous section, the inclusion of PI and DEMOC variables in a 
traditional export equation allows for the consideration of internal factors that may affect 
export demand beyond the effects of exchange rates and income alone.  An augmented export 
demand function is given as:
1  
   
   01 2 3 4 ln ln ln it it it it it it XP X Y D E M O C P I ββ β β β ε =+ + + + +      (1)
   
Where X represents real exports growth, A is a constant term, it PX  represents the real exchange 
rates (price of exports), and 1 β  is the price elasticity of demand for exports and the expected 
sign is negative. Y denotes the importing country’s income, and  2 β  is the income elasticity, 
                                                 
1 A reviewer noted that the variability in agricultural exports could also be due to supply side factors (e.g. weather 
variability, U.S. agricultural policy). Although this is an accurate observation, the current study is primarily 
focused on the demand side with special emphasis on the possible impact of political instability abroad on foreign 
demand for U.S. agricultural exports. In addition, time series plot of U.S. agricultural exports over the 1990-2000 
range reveals that the variable trend was not very volatile.   
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and t denotes time subscript. The expected sign of the income elasticity is positive. DEMOC is 
a measure of the degree of general openness of political (democratic) institutions and PI 
denotes a form of political instability in the importing country. The expected sign of 3 β , the 
DEMOC coefficient, is positive while  4 β is also expected to be positive.  it ε is the error term 
and it is normally distributed with zero mean and constant variance. 
 
3.1 Measures of Political and Institutional Instability  
DEMOC is an index with scores ranging from 0 (lowest) to 10 (highest). The DEMOC variable 
scores each country by using four criteria:  (i) competition in participation in the political 
process, (ii) competition in recruitment of the executive, (iii) openness of the recruitment of the 
executive, and (iv) independence of the chief executive. Several authors have shown that the 
existence of democratic institutions is a key determinant of trade (Pollins, 1989, Morrow et al, 
1998). For instance, high DEMOC scores are recorded by democratic political systems in 
nations such as the United States, Canada, and most members of the European Union. 
Historically, U.S. trade policy is an integral part of its overall foreign policy. Summary (1989) 
noted that the U.S. engages in more trading activities with other democratic nations since this 
policy serves both U.S. economic and political interests.  
Three alternative measures of political instability were used. The first variable, 
Elite_PI, is measured as the frequency of government crises. It serves as a proxy measure of 
executive transition in national government. As in Alesina and Perotti (1996), it is assumed that 
a high propensity to executive changes implies political uncertainty and potential threat to 
property rights. In contrast to the first measure of political instability, the remaining two 
measures are based upon indicators of social unrest and political violence. The second measure 
of political instability, Social_PI, is the frequency of riots and protests. This variable serves as 
a measure of national social unrest. The third political instability variable, Violent_PI, is 
proxied by the number of assassinations. This is a measure of the frequency of the occurrence 
of violent political activities.  As discussed previously, PI is hypothesized to disrupt domestic 
production process in the importing countries and thus serve as a domestic supply shifter. The 
reduction of domestic production by importers will lead to an increase in excess demand for 
imports and consequently lead to higher world price. As the world price rises, it would 
stimulate more supply of exports from the exporting country. Therefore, the effect of political 
instability on U.S. agricultural export is expected to be positive.   
 
3.2 Data  
The explanatory variables used in the empirical analysis are divided into two broad categories: 
(a) economic variables designed to measure the recent national economic trends, and (b) 
political variables that capture the significant political events that may signal future political 
disruptions. The full data set used covers 87 countries that imported U.S. agricultural products 
over the post Cold War sample period (1990 -2000). Table 1 presents a listing of the 87 
countries included in the study. The dependent variable is the value of exports from the U.S. to 
nation i, in time t, in millions of constant U.S. dollars. The control economic variables are real 
GDP of importers in millions of constant U.S. dollars, and the real exchange rates. The data on 
GDP, and real exchange rates were obtained from the Penn World Tables 6.1 (Heston et al, 
2002). Data on agricultural exports were obtained from USDA’s Foreign Agricultural Service  
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(FAS). The political variables, democracy and various measures of political instability were 
obtained from the Polity IV (Marshall et al, 2003) and Banks (2002) databases, respectively. 




Table 1.  Countries Included in the Sample Panel Data.
Africa South America OECD Middle East Asia
Benin Argentina Australia Bangladesh China
Botswana Bolivia Austria Egypt Indonesia
Cameroon Brazil Belgium India Korea Republic
Chad Chile Canada Iran Malaysia
Cote d'Ivoire Colombia Denmark Israel Philippines
Ethiopia Costa Rica Finland Jordan Thailand
Gabon Dominican Republic France Morocco
Ghana Ecuador Germany Nepal
Kenya El Salvador Greece Pakistan
Madagascar Guatemala Iceland Sri Lanka
Malawi Guyana Ireland Syria
Mali Haiti Italy Tunisia
Mauritius Honduras Japan Turkey
Mozambique Jamaica Netherlands




Sierra Leone Peru Sweden
South Africa Trinidad Switzerland





Regional groupings of countries are based on the classifications used by the World Bank.  
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4.  Estimation and Empirical Results 
 
Hsiao (2003) argue that OLS estimates of equation (1) may yield biased estimates if certain 
specification issues are not adequately addressed. First, for a large and diverse cross-section of 
countries as in this study, OLS is subject to unobservable heterogeneity bias. A common 
remedy is the specification of a model that includes country specific fixed effects in the panel 
regressions. The fixed effects estimator, which accounts for the unobserved country-specific 
effects require  the transformation of equation (1) so that each variable for each country is 
normalized in such a way that the time-invariant country-specific effects are removed.  
Second, endogeneity problem may exist because the causal link between export 
demand, price, and political instability may be bi-directional. For example, while export growth 
may affect PI, the reverse is also possible. If endogeneity problem is confirmed, then an 
instrumental variable (IV) estimation method will be more appropriate. The Hausman test was 
used to determine the presence of the endogeneity problem and the test results fail to provide 
statistically significant evidence in support of endogeneity of the regressors. Since 
heteroskedasticity is a problem for panel data, the parameter estimates were calculated based 
on robust standard errors from White’s (1980) heteroskedasticity-consistent covariance matrix.  
Although many previous studies aggregated data from many countries, some authors 
have shown that income and price elasticities can vary widely across regions (Senhadji and 
Montenegro, 1999, Santos-Paulino, 2002). Hence, parameter estimates from widely aggregated 
countries data may be unreliable given the diverse nature of the trade policies, economic, and 
political characteristics of these nations. To determine if the elasticities and impact of political 
instability differ across geographical regions, the importing countries in the sample were 
divided into five sub-groups: Sub-Sahara Africa, East Asia, Middle East, OECD, and South 
America. 
Table 2 presents the results from the panel fixed effect model
2 using the number of 
assassinations as the measure of violent political instability. The results for all countries in 
column 2 show a statistically significant relationship between U.S. agricultural exports and the 
economic control variables (importer income growth and change in prices). The income 
elasticity of 0.919 and the export price elasticity of -0.017 have the expected sign and are both 
significantly different from zero. The income elasticity estimate is broadly consistent with 
those of earlier studies for U.S. agricultural exports (Belongia, 1986, Batten and Belongia, 
1986, Cho et al, 2002). The low price elasticity may reflect loss of export revenues in the 1990s 
as many importers made themselves more competitive via the devaluation of their currencies 
relative to the U.S. dollar. Furthermore, the democracy index has a positive and significant 
impact on U.S. agricultural trade.  
Similar to the significant democracy coefficient, the measure of violent PI is also 
positive and statistically significant at the one percent level. This implies that U.S. export 
demand increases in order to make up for the short term shortage in food availability due to 
domestic political instability in the importing country. Some of the impact of PI on US 
agricultural trade with the poorer nations may reflect the effect of the U.S. food aid program 
                                                 
2 This study also considered the random effects model, but the Hausman test indicates that the fixed effect 
model is better. This is to be expected as the sample of 87 countries included in this study contains the vast 
majority of countries that import agricultural products from the U.S.  
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exports. The impact of the Public Law 480 Program (PL480), also known as the Food for Peace 
Program, is greater for low-income countries with under-developed economic and political 
institutions. Under Title I of the PL480 program, the U.S. government provides long-term 
concessional credit (up to thirty-year loan) to the recipient nation for the purchase of U.S. 
agricultural commodities. It is reasonable to assume that food aid programs account for part of 
the increase in food exports to politically unstable nations in parts of Sub-Sahara Africa and 
Southeast Asia. Importing nations such as Angola, Ethiopia, and Bangladesh are perennial 
beneficiaries of the PL480 Food for Peace Program. 
 
 
Table 2. Effect of Violent Political Instability on U.S. Agricultural Exports (1990-2000).
Independent 
Variables
Total OECD Africa Asia




Income 0.919*** 0.453*** 0.147*** 0.883*** 1.499*** 0.863***
(18.99) (2.98) (2.91) (4.93) (6.99) (3.56)
Export Price -0.017* -0.174*** 0.009* 0.002 0.020 -0.024**
(-1.89) (-3.08) (1.80) (0.13) (0.93) (-2.14)
DEMOC 0.002* 0.060*** -0.001 0.005* 0.002 -0.006
(1.66) (3.72) (-1.37) (1.67) (0.50) (-1.25)
Violent_PI 0.016*** -0.001 0.028** 0.005 0.022* 0.006**
(7.68) (-0.21) (2.02) (0.33) (1.72) (2.33)
R
2  0.45 0.28 0.06 0.88 0.68 0.32
Heteroskedasticity-consistent t-statistics in parentheses.  All regressions include time dummies.
*  Significant at the 10% level; **  Significant at the 5% level; ***  Significant at the 1% level.  
 
 
Next, the results from the regionally disaggregated data are presented in Table 2 
(columns 3-7). As expected the estimated parameters vary by region. The income elasticity, 
which is statistically significant at the one percent level for all regions, is largest for the Middle 
East (1.499) and smallest for Africa (0.147). Export price elasticity estimates are statistically 
significant and negative for OECD and South American countries. Similarly, the degree of 
democratic practices positively  affects U.S. exports to OECD and Asian countries. The impact 
of PI on U.S. exports is positive and statistically significant for Sub-Sahara Africa, Middle 
East, and South America. This outcome is plausible since these three regions have experienced 
a considerable number of political events that can be perceived as sources of regional 
instability.    
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Tables 3 and 4 present estimates for measures of social and elite political instabilities, 
respectively.
3  Relative to earlier conclusions for Violent_PI (in Table 2), the estimated income 
and price elasticities and democracy estimates for the models are very similar. The key 
difference in the empirical results is in the estimates for PI. From Table 3, U.S. export demand 
responds to social PI (Riots) using the aggregate (total) data. However at the regional level, 
U.S. export does not respond to Social_PI (Riots).  The only exception is Africa. This finding is 
supported by popular news reports of regular occurrences of civil unrests and mass riots in 
many cities in Sub-Sahara Africa.  As shown in Table 4, while the estimated impact of Elite_PI 
(Government crises) is statistically significant for the aggregate data, it is not significant for 
most of the regions. The southeast Asia region is the only exception where the Elite_PI 
coefficient is significant at the one percent level. Many Asian democracies subscribe to the 
parliamentary form of government that is more prone to unexpected changes at the executive 
level due to cabinet reshuffles or changes in the prime ministerial office. Such abrupt changes 
can have significant impact on foreign investment and key macroeconomic indicators (e.g., 
inflation, interest rate, and exchange rate) which ultimately affect trade levels. 
 
 
Table 3. Effect of Social Political Instability on U.S. Agricultural Exports (1990-2000).
Independent 
Variables
Total OECD Africa Asia




Income 0.920*** 0.444*** 0.158*** 0.875*** 1.457*** 0.837***
(18.57) (2.83) (3.15) (5.16) (6.84) (3.57)
Export Price -0.015* -0.176*** 0.009* -0.005 0.015 -0.024**
(-1.67) (-3.09) (1.75) (-0.51) (0.66) (-2.32)
DEMOC 0.002* 0.058*** -0.002 0.005** 0.002 -0.007
(1.65) (4.02) (-1.50) (1.96) (0.58) (-1.49)
Social_PI 0.007*** -0.005 0.014*** 0.001 0.003 0.006
(3.48) (-1.11) (3.28) (0.61) (0.80) (0.76)
R
2  0.43 0.28 0.07 0.88 0.66 0.31
Heteroskedasticity-consistent t-statistics in parentheses.  All regressions include time dummies.
*  Significant at the 10% level; **  Significant at the 5% level; ***  Significant at the 1% level.  
 
 
                                                 
3 To test the robustness of the three PI measures reported in Tables 2-4, each model was also estimated with 
alternative PI proxies as follows: Revolutions; Coup d’etats; General labor strikes; Anti-government 
demonstrations; and Guerilla warfare. The empirical results from these alternative indicators of PI provide 
conclusions similar to those reported.  
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Although the positive signs on the PI measures may indicate that more political unrest 
and instability abroad is good for U.S. agricultural exports, there is need for caution. The 
empirical results need to be placed in perspective and within the context of actual bilateral 
trade flow by regions. The income elasticity estimates are much larger than the PI and 
democracy variable estimates. This indicates that the foreign income growth effect has a larger 
impact than PI on the demand for U.S. exports abroad. In addition, since PI has been shown to 
negatively impact domestic national income, the small positive impact of PI on export demand 
is even smaller as the effect is possibly weakened by the corresponding reduction in purchasing 
power in the importing country. Furthermore, historical trade data show that the majority of 
U.S. trade is with other industrial nations, such as the OECD members.
4 In comparison to the 
economically poorer regions, the industrial nations tend to have stronger political institutions 
and higher income level that translates into higher purchasing power.  Therefore, relative to the 
effects of economic variables (income and price) on trade, the impact of political variables on 




Table 4. Effect of Elite Political Instability on U.S. Agricultural Exports (1990-2000).
Independent 
Variables
Total OECD Africa Asia




Income 0.911*** 0.456*** 0.147*** 0.836*** 1.474*** 0.799***
(18.65) (3.04) (2.89) (5.55) (6.66) (3.19)
Export Price -0.017* -0.174*** 0.009* 0.051* 0.014 -0.023**
(-1.73) (-3.05) (1.76) (1.87) (0.66) (-2.15)
DEMOC 0.002 0.060*** -0.001 0.007*** 0.002 -0.007
(1.61) (3.56) (-1.36) (3.10) (0.40) (-1.48)
Elite_PI 0.012** 0.001 0.021 -0.032*** 0.015 -0.011
(2.18) (0.09) (1.22) (-3.28) (1.23) (-1.38)
R
2  0.43 0.28 0.05 0.90 0.65 0.31
Heteroskedasticity-consistent t-statistics in parentheses.  All regressions include time dummies.




                                                 
4 Trade data in 2001 show that eight of the top ten importers of US agricultural products were high income 
industrial nations (Japan, Canada, Mexico, South Korea, Taiwan, Netherlands, Hong Kong, and the United 
Kingdom) and they accounted for about sixty-one percent of total US agricultural export value.   
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5.  Concluding Remarks 
 
This paper examined the potential impact of foreign political instability on U.S. agricultural 
exports by analyzing a sample panel data set that includes 87 importing countries of U.S. 
agricultural products covering the 1990-2000 period. Three alternative measures of political 
instability were used: a measure of executive transition in national government (Elite_PI), a 
measure of the frequency of social unrest (Social_PI), and a measure of the frequency of the 
occurrence of violent political unrest (Violent_PI).  
The empirical results show that the three measures of political instability are 
statistically significant, but with a positive sign. This suggests that cases of political instability 
can actually increase the foreign export demand for U.S. agricultural products. This finding is 
only plausible if we assume that domestic political instability disrupt local agricultural 
production, but does not cut off communication and transportation routes necessary for imports 
of food and other agricultural products. Furthermore, consistent with previous studies, U.S. 
agricultural export demand is also found to be significantly affected by economic variables 
such as foreign income and export price.  
As discussed earlier, the results from this analysis do not necessarily imply that political 
instability is beneficial for U.S. exports. The econometric model estimates tell a partial story 
and the conclusions from the results must be interpreted with care. A closer examination of the 
estimates in Tables 2-4 shows that the impact of the economic factors on trade is relatively 
larger than the impact of the political variables. Previous studies have established the negative 
relationship between political instability and economic growth (Barro, 1991, Alesina and 
Rodrik, 1994, Persson and Tabellini, 1994, Easterly and Levine, 1997). This implies that a 
politically unstable nation will have lower productivity and national income. Thus, in the long 
run, political instability will lead to a reduction in a nation’s ability to pay for its imports. As 
seen in many politically unstable and low-income economies, the net importer nation’s ever 
increasing trade imbalance and larger national debt burden may not be sustainable.  Future 
export demand will have to be reduced. Although political instability can encourage more trade 
in the short-term horizon, it will ultimately cause negative consequences for the domestic 
importing nations and the global economy. In terms of policy implications of this study, the 
short term spike in U.S. exports due to foreign political instability is outweighed by the income 
growth effect. One limitation of this study is that it only focused on the short-run effects of 
political instability. However in future research, the framework presented in this study could be 
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